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Recent Developments in International Criminal Law:
2011-2012
Valerie Oosterveld*

I have been asked to provide you with a review of
developments in international criminal law from August
2011 to August 2012. I will do this by framing my
comments through two questions: first, what made it into
the media headlines in 2011-2012? Second, what did not
make it into the headlines but is important nonetheless?

Special Court for Sierra Leone
This year's session of the International
Humanitarian Law Dialogs is focused on the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), so I begin with this
Tribunal. The oral judgment in the SCSL's case of
Prosecutorv. Charles Taylor was handed down by Trial
Chamber II on April 26, 2012.1 The written judgment

Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario (Canada). I wish to
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Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada, which provided
funding to assist me in researching the gender-related aspects of the
international criminal jurisprudence.
I Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment
Summary (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II,
April 26, 2012).
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was released on May 18, 2012 and was 2,532 pages in
length, perhaps the longest international criminal
judgment issued to date. 2 Taylor faced an 11-count
indictment for crimes against humanity and war crimes. 3
These charges included the crimes against humanity of
murder, rape, sexual slavery, enslavement, and other
inhumane acts, and the war crimes of committing acts of
terror, murder, outrages upon personal dignity, cruel
treatment, pillage and conscripting or enlisting children
under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups,
and using them to participate actively in hostilities.4 In a
unanimous judgment, Trial Chamber II convicted Taylor
on all counts of aiding and abetting the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) rebel groups and/or Liberian fighters
operating in Sierra Leone. 5
Taylor was also convicted of planning certain
crimes. 6 Specifically, Taylor was found to have provided

2 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, May 18, 2012)
[Taylor Trial Judgment].
3 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT,
Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment (Special Court for Sierra
Leone, May 29, 2007).
4 1d. at counts 1-11.
5 Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 2,
6 Id. at

7000(ii).

1 7000(i).
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assistance to the RUF, the AFRC, or the joint RUFAFRC junta in a number of ways. First, he was found to
have provided arms and ammunition, either directly or
through intermediaries. For example, he facilitated two
large shipments of arms used by the RUF in its military
operations, including Operation Pay Yourself and the
Freetown invasion. These weapons and ammunition had
a substantial effect on the crimes committed by the RUF
and RUF-AFRC during the indictment period.7 Second,
he was found to have provided military personnel who
helped commit crimes in various operations.8 Third, he
was found to have provided operational support, such as
phones and radio contact, and financial support-for
example, funds to RUF leader Sam Bockarie (former
Battlefield commander of the RUF) to purchase arms. 9
He also provided a guesthouse in Monrovia, the capital
of Liberia, for the RUF, which facilitated their
procurement of arms and ammunition.10 Fourth, he was
found to have provided security escorts, free passage
through checkpoints, medical support, safe haven for
RUF fighters, food, clothes, cigarettes, and alcohol for
the RUF. 11 Finally, the Trial Chamber found that he had
provided moral support through ongoing advice and

7

Id. at IT 6917-6921.

8 Id. at T 6924-6930.
9 Id. at % 6933-6943.
10

d. at

6939.

11Id. at16940-6941.
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encouragement on tactics to senior members of the
RUF. 12
Taylor was also found guilty of working with Sam
Bockarie to select strategic areas within Sierra Leone to
attack and control, namely the diamond areas and
Freetown. 13 The Trial Chamber referred to this as the
Bockarie-Taylor two-pronged attack. 14 Taylor was found
to have told Bockarie to make the attacks "fearful," and
Bockarie repeated this request, again and again, as he
conveyed his orders for the attacks. 15 Taylor was also
found to have told Bockarie to "use all means" to get to
Freetown.1 6 The Court found that these directives
contributed to the brutal nature of the atrocities
committed in the invasion of Freetown.17 The Trial
Chamber found that Taylor was kept aware of the
evolution of the Bockarie-Taylor plan and the resulting
RUF-AFRC crimes committed against civilians. 1 8

12 Id. at

6946-6952.

13 Id. at %6964-6975.
14 Id. at TT 6964, 6970.
15 Id. at
16

6964-6965, 6975.

Id. at

6964, 6975.

17 Id. at

6973-6975.

18 Id. at 6975.
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The Trial Chamber also held that the Prosecutor
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor
had superior responsibility for the RUF, AFRC, joint
RUF-AFRC junta, and/or Liberian fighters, or that he
had participated in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) with
these groups. 19 The Trial Chamber additionally held that
the Prosecutor did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Taylor had ordered RUF or AFRC crimes in Sierra
Leone. 20 The Court concluded that the RUF's leadersFoday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, and Issa Sesay-did not
take orders from Taylor, though Taylor did provide them
with guidance.21
While the "not guilty" finding on certain modes of
liability was surely a disappointment to the Prosecutor,
the verdict was also clearly a disappointment for the
defense, who had argued that Taylor was not involved
with the conflict except as an elder statesman trying to
bring peace to Sierra Leone. 2 2 The Trial Chamber found
that Taylor was hypocritical-claiming to advance peace
in Sierra Leone while supporting war. 23
19 Id. at
20 Id. at

6897-6906, 6983-6992.
6979.

21 id.
22

23

Id. at

17(iv).

Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T,
Sentencing Judgment (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial
Chamber II, May 30, 2012), TT 96-97 [Taylor Sentencing
Judgment].
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The exchange of diamonds was an important part of
the Trial Chamber's discussion: Taylor was found to
have accepted diamonds from the RUF-so-called
"blood diamonds"-and, in exchange, to have supplied
the RUF with weapons and ammunition. 24 Taylor was
also found to have accepted diamonds from the RUF to
hold for "safekeeping." 25
One unusual and very curious event occurred at the
end of the oral reading of the trial judgment. After the
judgment had been read, but a moment before the
microphone had been turned off, the alternate judge,
Judge Sow, began to make a statement. Judge Sow had
been appointed as an alternate, which means that he was
not one of the judges empowered to make a binding
decision. 26 He was there in the event that one of the
other judges could not carry on (became ill or otherwise
had to leave the bench of the trial). If that happened,
Judge Sow would be able to step in and serve as the third
required judge without an interruption in the trial. It may
seem like a luxury to have a fourth judge sit through the
entire trial but, in fact, if the worst-case scenario did
occur, it would save the need for a retrial for such a long,
complex, and high-level case.

24 Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 2,
6061.
25

T 5877, 5951, 5993, 6060-

Id. at 6060.

26 Special Court for Sierra Leone Rules of Procedure and
Evidence,
Rule 16 bis (adopted May 14, 2007).
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Just as the regular judges were leaving the
courtroom, Judge Sow made an unexpected statement,
the beginning of which was caught on the microphone,
and the end of which was caught by the Court's
stenographer. One of the legal assistants from the Taylor
defense team copied and distributed the text, which was
struck from the official transcript. 27 Judge Sow said:
The only moment where a Judge can express
his opinion is during the deliberations or in the
courtroom, and pursuant to the rules, when
there is no deliberations, the only place for me
in the courtroom. I won't get-because I think
we have been sitting for too long but for me I
have my dissenting opinion and I disagree
with the findings and conclusions of the other
Judges, standard of proof the guilt of the
accused from the evidence provided in this
trial is not proved beyond reasonable doubt by
the Prosecution. And my only worry is that the
whole system is not consistent with all the
principles we know and love, and the system
is not consistent with the values of
international criminal justice, and I'm afraid
the whole system is under grave danger of just

27 The striking of Judge Sow's statement from the official transcript
forms part of Taylor's appeal: Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case
No. SCSL-2003-01-A, Public with Confidential Annex A and Public
Annexes B and C, Appellant's Submissions of Charles Ghankay
Taylor (Special Court for Sierra Leone, October 1, 2012), IT 690707 [Taylor Appeal briefj.
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losing all credibility, and I'm afraid this whole
thing is heading for failure. 28

It was a rather dramatic and unexpected conclusion,
but it is not clear what Judge Sow meant by this. 29
On May 30, Taylor was sentenced to a term of 50
years of imprisonment. 30 This was longer than many
commentators expected, but shorter than the term of 80
years requested by the Prosecutor. Taylor is appealing
both the trial judgment and his sentence. The Prosecutor
28 This statement is reproduced in id. at Public Annex C. Taylor's
defense counsel brought an unsuccessful motion for partial
voluntary withdrawal or disqualification of Appeals Chambers
judges because these judges had participated in the judicial plenary
suspending Judge Sow as a result of his behaviour at the close of the
oral judgement in the Taylor case: Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Decision on Charles Ghankay Taylor's
Motion for Partial Voluntary Withdrawal or Disqualification for
Appeals Chambers Judges (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals
Chamber, September 13, 2012).
29 This has led to discussion. See e.g., Jennifer Easterday, "Judge
Sow's Struck Statement & Reflections on the Taylor Judgment &
the SCSL's Legacies", IntLawGrrls blog (April 28, 2012), online:
http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/04/judge-sows-struck-statementreflections.html; and William Schabas, "More Mystery About the
Charles Taylor Judgment (and its Appeal)", PhD Studies in Human
Rights
blog
(September
14,
2012),
online:
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.ca/2012/09/more-mysteryabout-charles-taylor.html.
30 Taylor Sentencing Judgment, supra note 23, 40.
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is also appealing. Taylor's Notice of Appeal listed 45
grounds of appeal, and the Prosecutor's Notice listed
four grounds of appeal. 3 1 These grounds for appeal
include appeals based on Justice Sow's statement, and
the defense is claiming irregularities in deliberations,
with Justice Sow's statement as evidence. 32
How was this judgment received in the international
community? Many individuals and governmentsincluding the U.N. Secretary-General-hailed it as an
illustration that no one is above the law, not even the
most powerful individuals in a given society. 33 And, I
think, this is an important message that should not be
underestimated, one that provides hope and also points
to the potential that individuals such as Omar Al-Bashir,
President of Sudan-against whom a warrant of arrest
has been issued by the ICC for crimes in Darfur-will,
eventually, be brought to justice. But how was Taylor's
conviction received in Sierra Leone and Liberia?
Largely, it was also hailed. 34 Predictably, Taylor's
31 Taylor Appeal brief, supra note 27; and Prosecutor v. Charles
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-01-01-A, Public Prosecution Appellant's
Submissions With Confidential Sections D & E of the Book of
Authorities (Special Court for Sierra Leone, October 1, 2012).
32 Taylor Appeal brief, supra note 27, % 690-707.
33 UN News Centre, "UN Officials Welcome Court's Guilty
Verdict in Charles Taylor Trial" (April 26, 2012), online:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=41864.
34 See, e.g., IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, "Sierra Leone:
"Now we can move on" (April 26, 2012), online:
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supporters in Liberia said that it was unfair that he was
singled out or that the judgment was an example of a
neo-colonialist imposition of Western law on Liberia. 35
However, victims and victims groups have a different
view. As Abioseh, a former "bush wife" told IRIN
News, "Taylor got what he was due-now we have seen
justice and can move on." 36
The Taylor judgment deservedly received the
attention of the media. However, the SCSL has been
very busy in other ways, many of which were not
discussed in the media. The Court has been busy
addressing a number of cases related to witness
tampering or other interference with the work of the
Court. On June 22, 2012, Justice Teresa Doherty
convicted a former member of the Revolutionary United
Front, Eric Koi Senessie, on eight out of nine counts of
witness tampering. 37 Senessie was convicted on four
counts of offering a bribe to a witness and on four counts
of attempting to influence a witness to recant testimony
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=95368
"Now we can move on"].

[IRIN,

35 See, e.g., Mark Doyle and Jonathan Paye-Layley, "Taylor
Verdict: Liberians and Sierra Leoneans React" (BBC World News,
April 26, 2012), online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world17859012?print=true/.
36 IRIN, "Now we can move on", supra note 24.
37 Prosecutor v. Eric Senessie, Case No. SCSL-2011-01-T,
Judgment in Contempt Proceedings (Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Trial Chamber II, June 21, 2012) 28-30.
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given in the Taylor trial. 38 He was sentenced on July 5,
receiving a two-year term of imprisonment. 39 Under the
Rules of the Special Court, Senessie faced a maximum
sentence of seven-years imprisonment, a fine of two
million leones, or both.4 0 Senessie will serve his
sentence at a detention facility on the Special Court
premises in Freetown. 41
The Court has also been busy downsizing as it
implements its completion strategy. After the close of
appeals in the Taylor case, the Court will officially
close. 42 Then, its remaining duties and responsibilities
will be turned over to a residual mechanism; the Court
cannot simply close its doors and walk away. First, there
are victims and witnesses who must continue to be
protected. Many are at risk of retaliation for testifying
38 Id.
39 Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach and Public Affairs
office, "Press Release: "Eric Koi Senessie Sentenced to Two Years
in Prison for Contempt of the Special Court" (July 5, 2012), online:
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=UQPeIGgBKww%3
d&tabid=232.
40

id.

41 Id.

42 Special Court for Sierra Leone, "Ninth Annual Report of the
President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: June 2011-May
2012" (Freetown, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2012) 38-39,
online:
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-ZEDnSBp
6ahc%3d&tabid=176.
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before the Court, and this risk might last for decades.
Therefore, it is crucial that they have a place to turn
should they face any threats or danger. Second, the Court
has a large number of materials-documents, physical
evidence, tapes of proceedings, videos of proceedings,
outreach materials, etc. It is very important that they
remain available to Sierra Leoneans and to the
international community, balanced against the need to
keep some materials confidential, for example, to
continue to protect victims and witnesses. Thus, the
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone will manage
these archives. 43 The Court has been fundraising for the
Residual Special Court, which will be voluntarily funded
(as is the SCSL itself). 4 4 I am very concerned about this:
if the Court had severe difficulties fundraising for the
actual trials-including the most high profile Taylor
trial-how will it be able to fundraise for the long term
for the Residual Mechanism, which will carry out very
necessary, but, from a funder's point of view, quite
boring duties?

International Criminal Court
This year marks the tenth anniversary of the creation
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC was
created as a permanent court to address the most serious
international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity,
43 Id. at 38.
44 Id. at 39.
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and war crimes, and perhaps, in the future, aggression. 45
It is prospective in that the crimes it considers must have
taken place after July 1, 2002.46 At present, the Court is
active in eight situations (in Central African Republic,
Cote d'Ivoire, Darfur (Sudan), the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Northern Uganda)
and is considering 16 cases (some of these cases have
multiple accused). There was much media coverage of
four very important events over the past year.
In the first judgment issued by the ICC, on
March 14, 2012, Thomas Lubanga was convicted of the
war crimes of conscripting, enlisting, and using children
under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities
from September 1, 2002, to August 13, 2003.47 Lubanga,
the first person to stand trial before the ICC, is the
founder and former President of the Union des Patriotes
Congolais (UPC), and former Commander-in-Chief of
the Forces Patriotiquespour la Liberation du Congo
(FPLC), a militia group operating in the Ituri region of
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).4 8
45 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5-8,
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
46

See id. at art. 11.

47 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (International Criminal Court,
Trial Chamber 1, March 14, 2012)
1358 [Lubanga Trial
Judgment].
48

Id. at TT 22, 28.
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On July 10, 2012, Trial Chamber I sentenced Lubanga to
14 years of imprisonment, which, after accounting for
time served, will amount to eight more years of
imprisonment from the date of sentencing. 4 9 This was
significantly less than the prosecution's request of 30
years, but the Court indicated it was based on the gravity
and nature of his crimes, harm done to victims and their
families, the circumstances of the conflict, Lubanga's
personal circumstances, and his position of authority. 50
The Lubanga case is notable for its subject matterchild soldiers. As the evidence emerged in the case, it
highlighted the vulnerability of children in conflict who
are forced to serve as soldiers or in other support roles
for armed groups, for example in battle, as bodyguards
for senior officials like Lubanga, or to perform domestic
work for soldiers. The case also demonstrated that those
who are responsible for recruiting and using children in
war can be held accountable. Many former child
soldiers, male and female, were also active participants
in the trial, with many providing testimony. The
testimony demonstrated that boy and girl soldiers were

49 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on
Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute (International
Criminal Court, Trial Chamber I, July 10, 2012) t 107 [Lubanga
Sentencing Decision]. Lubanga had already spent six years in
detention in The Hague: Coalition for the International Criminal
Court,
'Lubanga
Case',
available
online
at
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=drc (last accessed June 10,
2013).
50

Lubanga Sentencing Decision, supra note 49 at

97.
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subjected to brutal treatment, with girl soldiers also
subjected to sexual violence, including rape. On this, the
evidence showed that rape was pervasive: girls were
raped as they were being recruited as child soldiers;
during their training, recruits were encouraged to rape;
and child soldiers were taught to abduct and bring girls
and women to UPC camps to be raped.5 ' Girl soldiers
were very vulnerable, often experiencing rape as a daily
part of their lives in the UPC. 52 Girls who became
pregnant were sent away from the UPC camp, and
unfortunately
were
often
shunned
by
their
53
communities. As Lubanga was not charged with sexual
violence crimes, this evidence was used solely for the
purpose of illustrating the context of Lubanga's acts. 54
The prosecution's use of intermediaries proved
problematic in this case. Intermediaries are third parties,
usually on the ground, who are not from the Court. They
play an important role in locating and communicating
with victims and witnesses and linking them with the

51 For a summary of the evidence in this respect, see Women's
Initiatives for Gender Justice, Legal Eye on the ICC eLetter, 'DRC:
Trial Chamber I Issues First Trial Judgment of the ICC - Analysis
of Sexual Violence in the Judgment" (Special Issue #1 - May 2012),
http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/WI-LegalEye5-12online:
FULL/LegalEye5-12.html.
52

53

id
id.

54 Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 47 at T 896.
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ICC's Office of the Prosecutor to gain the evidence
needed for a trial. Intermediaries are very important in
the Court's work, but the Trial Chamber found that the
prosecution's undue reliance on three of its principal
intermediaries, without appropriate supervision, created
the significant possibility that they improperly
influenced witnesses to falsify their testimony, rendering
most of it unreliable.55 The Chambers did not direct the
Prosecutor to stop working with intermediaries; instead
it indicated that the prosecution could not delegate its
investigative work to intermediaries. 56 The Court has
responded to these concerns-draft Court guidelines on
the use and oversight of intermediaries were completed
in 2011.57 These Draft Guidelines are to be considered
by the ICC Assembly of States Parties meeting in
November 2012.
There has largely been a positive response to the
Court's judgment in Lubanga. For example, Human
Rights Watch called the decision "a victory for the
thousands of children forced to fight in Congo's brutal

55
56

Id. at IT. 178-477.
id

57 Draft Guidelines Governing the Relationship between the Court

and Intermediaries, as cited in Open Society Justice Initiative,
"Intermediaries and the International Criminal Court: A Role for the
Assembly of States Parties" (December 2011), online:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/intermediariesand-international-criminal-court-role-assembly-states-parties.
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wars." 58 There have been, however, mixed reviews of
the 14-year judgment. Some victims felt the sentence
was too lenient, while others expressed their appreciation
for the verdict but also demanded that Bosco Ntaganda
be similarly held to account. 59
Since the Lubanga judgment is the first issued by
the ICC, it is also the first to consider the issue of
reparations. This was not highlighted in the international
media, but on August 7, 2012, Trial Chamber I of the
International Criminal Court issued guidance on
addressing reparations for victims of Lubanga's
crimes. 60 In their lengthy decision, the judges stressed
the importance of reparations in international criminal
law. Reparations go "beyond the notion of punitive

58 Human Rights Watch, "ICC: Landmark Verdict a Warning to
Rights
Abusers"
(March
14,
2012),
online:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/14/icc-landmark-verdictwarning-rights-abusers.
59 See e.g., IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, "DRC: Lubanga
Verdict "a
First
Step"
(March
14,
2012),
online:
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=95073;
IRIN
Humanitarian News and Analysis, "Global: New ICC Prosecutor
Vows
to
Focus
on
Victims"
(July
30,
2012),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/95982/global-new-icc-prosecutorvows-to-focus-on-victims. Bosco Ntaganda was Lubanga's chief of
military operations - his case is discussed infra.
60 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be
Applied to Reparations (International Criminal Court, Trial
Chamber 1, August 7, 2012).
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justice, towards a solution which is more inclusive,
encourages participation and recognizes the need to
provide effective remedies for victims." 6 1 Reparations
are specifically mentioned in Article 75 of the Rome
Statute, the founding document of the ICC, which lists
restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation as forms of
reparations. The judges also noted that reparations with
symbolic, preventative, or transformative value may be
appropriate. 62 They stressed that reparations should be
applied in a "broad and flexible manner" and laid out
principles to be applied in the Lubanga case. 63 One such
principle is that victims are to be treated fairly and
equally, irrespective of whether they participated in the
trial proceedings. 64 However, priority may be given to
certain victims who are in a vulnerable situation, such as
victims of sexual violence, individuals who need
immediate medical care, and traumatized children. 65
Rule 97(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
states, "the Court may award reparations on an
individualized basis or, where it deems it appropriate, on
a collective basis or both," and the judges determined

61 Id. at

177.

62

Id. at 222.

63

Id. at 1180.

64

Id. at T 187.

65 Id. at

1200.
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that the Court should ensure there is a collective
approach that ensures reparations reach those victims
who are currently unidentified. 66 It was held that
individual and collective reparations are not mutually
exclusive and may be awarded concurrently. 67 Lubanga
has been declared indigent by the Court and cannot
contribute monetarily towards a reparations program.
However, he can, on his own volition, participate in
symbolic reparations, such as issuing a public apologybut the Court will not order such symbolic acts.68 As
well, since Lubanga does not have any assets, the ICC's
Trust Fund for Victims can use its own assets to award
reparations. 69
Going forward, the judges stated the reparations for
Lubanga's victims will be primarily handled by the
ICC's Trust Fund for Victims and overseen by a
different trial chamber of the ICC.7 0 The judges
endorsed a five-step implementation plan: the Trust
Fund for Victims, the Registry of the ICC, the ICC's
Office of Public Counsel for Victims, and an appointed
team of experts will first decide the localities to be

66

Id. at

219.

67

Id. at

220.

68 Id. at 269.
69,Id. at
70

Id.

270-271.
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involved with the reparations process specific to the
Lubanga case. 7 1 Second, consultations will be held in
each relevant location. 72 Third, the team of experts will
carry out an assessment of harm during the
consultations. 73 Fourth, reparations procedures and
principles will be explained to communities through a
series of public debates. 74 Finally, proposals from each
location will then be collected and presented to the Trial
Chamber overseeing reparations. 75
The second major story in the international media on
the ICC relates to Libya. On February 26, 2011, the U.N.
Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the
ICC.76 An investigation was initiated on March 3,
2011.77 Arrest warrants were issued on June 27, 2011 for

71 Id. at
72

T 281-282.

Id. at T 282.

73 Id.
74 Id.
75 id.

76 UNSC Res. 1970 (2011) (February 26, 2011),

4.

International Criminal Court, Statement of the Prosecutor, "ICC
Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya" (March 2, 2012),
online: http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/situations%20and%20
cases/situations/iccO 11 1/press%20releases/Pages/statement%200203
11 .aspx.
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Muammar Gadaffi, Saif Al-Islam Gadaffi (his son), and
Abdullah Al-Senussi (a Colonel in the Libyan Armed
Forces and head of Military Intelligence) for crimes
against humanity. Muammar Gadaffi was killed on
October 20, 2011, and his case was terminated.7 9 In
early June 2012, four ICC staff members from the Office
of Public Counsel for the defense were detained by
Libyan authorities following a meeting with their client,
Saif Gadaffi. 80 They were accused of spying and
smuggling documents to Mr. Gaddafi. 8 1 They were
detained
incommunicado,
despite
widespread
recognition that the detention was contrary to

78 Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Situation No. ICC01/11, Decision on the "Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article
58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi" (International Criminal Court,
Pre-Trial Chamber 1, June 27, 2011) 41.
79 Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Case
No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision to Terminate the case Against
Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi (International Criminal
Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, November 22, 2011) 5.
80 International Criminal Court, "Press Release: Four ICC Staff
Members Detained in Libya; Immediate Release Requested"
(June 9, 2012), online: http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/press
%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr805.aspx.
81 See e.g., Luke Harding, Julian Borger and Chris Stephen, "Libya
Accuses Australian ICC Official of Passing Secret Letter to
Gaddafi's Son" (The Guardian, June 25, 2012), online:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/25/melinda-taylor-libyaaccuse-spying.
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international law. 82 There were many calls for their
release, not only from the ICC, but also from, among
others, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and the SCSL. 83 All recognized what a very
serious threat such illegal detentions represented to their
work.
The ICC staff members were only released on
July 2, 2012, after three and a half weeks of detention,
and only after the ICC had apologized to Libya for any
"difficulties" caused by its staff.84 It appeared, from the
outside, as if the ICC had been forced to apologize.
Details later emerged of the staff members' ordeal, and it
became clear that the staff were not permitted to have a
confidential meeting with their client, were spied upon,
were secretly filmed, and documents protected by
lawyer-client privilege were seized.8 5
82 See e.g., United Nations Security Council, "Security Council
Press Statement on International Criminal Court Staff Detained in
Libya", UN Doc. SC/10674, AFR/2405, L/3196 (June 15, 2012).
83 See e.g., Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach and Public
Affairs office, "Press Release: Statement by Special Court President
Shireen Avis Fisher on the Detention of ICC Staff in Libya" (June
15, 2012), online: http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticketwngR2NLi8d0%3d&tabid=53.
84 International Criminal Court, "Press Release: Statement on the
Detention of Four ICC Staff Members" (June 22, 2012), online:
http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/press%20and%20media/press
%20releases/Pages/pr815.aspx.
85 For a summary of this, see Kevin John Heller, "The Most
Complete Account to Date of Melinda Taylor's Detention" (Opinio

Sixth International Humanitarian Law Dialogs 193

The Libyan government (the National Transition
Council) is challenging the ICC's jurisdiction over
Gadaffi and Al-Senussi. It claims that it wishes to
prosecute the two men in Libya, under Libyan law, by
Libyan judges, and that its national judicial system is
already
actively investigating. 86 Problematically,
however, Libya still does not actually have custody over
Gadaffi or Al-Senussi. Despite numerous declarations by
the NTC that he would be transferred to Tripoli, Saif
Gaddafi remains in the hands of the Zintan brigade that
arrested him in November 2011, which has refused to
surrender him to Libya's national authorities. 87 Given
the unwillingness of the Zintan brigade to cooperate with
the NTC, it is far from clear that Libyan authorities
themselves would be able to conduct the trial. As well,
Al-Senussi is not in Libya. In March 2012, he was
arrested in a joint operation between French and
Mauritanian authorities in the Mauritanian capital, where
he remains-Mauritania will not extradite him to
Libya.8 8 It appears that Libya will have some difficulty

Juris blog, August 1, 2012),
author/kevinjonheller/page/13/#.

online:

http://opiniojuris.org/

86 This challenge has now been decided with respect to Saif
Gaddafi, and these claims are highlighted in the Pre-Trial
Chamber's rejection of Libya's admissibility challenge: Prosecutor
v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif
Al-Islam Gaddafi (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber
1, May 31, 2013),
25-41, 182-198 [Libya Admissibility
Challenge].
87 Id. at %206-207.
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convincing the ICC that it is actually able to prosecute
the two men. 89 This also means is that the ICC itself
does not have the indictees in its custody, either.
The third set of headlines was quite recent and
involved an ICC indictee, Bosco Ntaganda, Thomas
Lubanga's Chief of Military Operations. The ICC issued
an arrest warrant for him in 2006 for the recruitment and
use of child soldiers. 90 On July 12, 2012, additional
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity were
added to his arrest warrant, including murder,
persecution, rape, sexual slavery, and pillaging. 9 1 Unlike
Lubanga, Ntaganda has eluded arrest. After his time with

88 This was correct at the time of the Sixth IHL Dialog: "ExGaddafi Spy Chief Al-Senussi "will not be Extradited" (BBC News
Africa, August 6, 2012), online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-19145021?print=true. However, shortly afterward, Mauritania
did extradite Al-Senussi to Libya: "Mauritania Deports Libya Spy
Chief Abdullah Al-Senussi" (BBC News Africa, September 5,
2012), online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19487228.
89 Indeed, this is the case with respect to Gadaffi. On May 31,
2013,
Pre-Trial Chamber I ruled against Libya's claim: Libya
Admissibility Challenge, supra note 86.
90 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06,
Warrant of Arrest (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber
I, August 22, 2006) 4.
91 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06,
Decision on the Prosecutor's Application Under Article 58
(International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II, July 13, 2012)
36.
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Lubanga, he joined another armed group and, in 2009,
was made a general in the Congolese army. The
Congolese government dismissed the ICC's calls for
Ntaganda's arrest and said he was necessary for the
peace process in eastern Congo. However, his forces
continued to commit atrocities and, for many, his case
became a lesson in what happens when impunity reigns.
In March 2012, Ntaganda mutinied and orchestrated
a new rebellion, known as the M23. His forces continued
to commit horrendous crimes. In April, finally, the
Congolese government said it was prepared to arrest
him. 92 But it has not been able to do so. M23 rebels are
taking over villages and towns in Rutshuru territory,
overthrowing the defenses of the Congolese army and
U.N. peacekeepers in the area. Human Rights Watch and
a U.N. group of experts have uncovered evidence that
Rwandan military officials have been supplying
weapons, ammunition, and recruits to Ntaganda and his
forces. 93 This certainly undermines international justice

92 See e.g., David Zounmenou and Naomi Kok, "Is President Joseph
Kabila's Call for Ntaganda's Arrest a Move Towards Justice in the
DRC?" (Institute for Security Studies, African Centre for Peace and
Security Training, 2012), online: http://www.issafrica.org/
acpst/news.php?nid= 15.
93 Human Rights Watch, "DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War
Crimes"
(September
11,
2012),
online:
http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2012/09/1 1/dr-congo-m23-rebelscommitting-war-crimes; United nations Security Council, Letter
Dated 26 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004)
Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the
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efforts and shows how important it is for ICC indictees
to be arrested sooner rather than later.
In an interesting about-face, in late August 2012, an
M23 commander accused the DRC army of recruiting
child soldiers, telling the media, "The law bans the
recruitment of child soldiers." 94 This demonstrates that
Lubanga's conviction has sent a message about the
unlawfulness of recruiting child soldiers, although it is
presented here by a group that is also accused of using
child soldiers.
I will briefly mention one more ICC-related
headline that reverberated in media outlets around the
world: on June 15, 2012, Fatou Bensouda made her
solemn undertaking and formally took office as the
Prosecutor of the ICC during a ceremony held at the seat
of the Court in The Hague. 95 She has been elected for a
nine-year term. The ceremony was presided over by ICC
President Sang-Hyun Song. Referring to Ms. Bensouda's
wealth of prosecutorial experience and staunch

President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2012/348/Add.1
(June 27, 2012).
94 South African Press Ass'n, "Rebels: DRC Army Recruits Child
Soldiers" (August 24, 2012), online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/
africa/rebels-drc-army-recruits-child-soldiers- 1.1369403.
95 Int'l Crim. Ct., "Press Release: Ceremony for the Solemn
Undertaking of the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda" (June 15,
online:
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en menus/icc/press
2012),
%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr8 11.aspx.
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international support, ICC President Song stated, "I am
confident that her strong independent voice, legal
expertise and genuine concern for human rights issues
will contribute greatly to the continued fight against
impunity." 96 In a lesser-known but very positive
development-one that did not make the international
headlines-Prosecutor Bensouda appointed Brigid Inder,
Executive Director of the Women's Initiatives for
Gender Justice, as her Special Gender Advisor. 97 MS.
Inder will provide strategic advice to the Office of the
Prosecutor on gender issues, including sexual and
gender-based violence.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
This past year, press attention on the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
tended to focus on the proceedings against two highprofile accused: Ratko Mladid and Radovan Karadli6.

96 As quoted in the International Criminal Court Weekly Update
#132 (June 18, 2012) 5, online: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres
/77F6A227-ODE5-4667-A538-5E25808DODC4/284634/ED132
ENG.pdf.
97 Int'l Crim. Ct., "Press Release: ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda
Appoints Brigid Inder, Executive Director of the Women's
Initiatives for Gender Justice, as Special Gender Advisor"
(August 21,
2012), online: http://www.icc-cpi.int/en menus/
icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20hig
hlights/Pages/pr833.aspx.
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Mladid was commander of the Main Staff of the Army of
the Republica Srpska, and he is charged with a number
of crimes, including rape and other acts of sexual
violence as a method to eliminate Bosnian Muslims and
Croats. 98 Kelly Askin of the Open Society Justice
Initiative has commented that this "recognizes the
profound and far-reaching impact that sex crimes have
on the individual victims, their families and whole
communities." 99 Mladid is also accused in relation to the
shelling and sniping campaign in Sarajevo and the plan
to eliminate Bosnian Muslims in the Srebenica
massacre. 100 After various setbacks, his trial began on
May 16, 2012, only to be halted again when it became
clear that the Prosecutor had failed to disclose a
substantial amount of evidence to the defense. 101 The
trial began again in June 2012,-and the presentation of

98 Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladid, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, Prosecution
Submission of the Fourth Amended Indictment and Schedules of
Incidents (International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber 1, December 16, 2011)
39(b) and (c),
52, 53, 59(e), 70 [Mladid Indictment].
9 Kelly Askin, "The Trial of Ratko Mladid: A Gender Crimes
Perspective" (Open Society Justice Initiative blog, May 16, 2012),
online:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/trial-ratkomladic-gender-crimes-perspective.
100 Mladid Indictment, supra note 98 at
7, 19, 21-23, 41-51, 5561, 64-65, 67-68, 72-74, 76-78, 80, 84-85, 87.
101

BBC News Europe, "Ratko Mladid War Crimes Trial
Suspended Over Evidence Error" (June 18, 2012), online:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18499018.
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evidence began on July 9. In May, Mladid caused
controversy for his demeanor in court when he made a
nasty throat-cutting gesture to a woman in the audience
whose son and husband were murdered in Srebrenica.1 02
The case of Radovan Karadli6, former President of
the Republika Srpska, also received much press
attention. Karad~i has been charged with participating
in a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly remove Bosnian
Muslims and Croats from territory claimed as Bosnian
Serb through genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes, including the Srebrenica massacre and the
sniping and shelling of Sarajevo.1 03 In late June, 2012,
the Trial Chamber decided to dismiss the genocide
charge relating to various municipalities in Bosnia,
though it left the genocide charge relating to
Srebrenica. 10 4 The prosecution started presenting
evidence on April 13, 2010. Its case was rested on
102 Julian Borger, "Ratko Mladid's Trial Opens with a Cut-Throat
online:
16,
2012),
May
Guardian,
(The
Gesture"
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/I 6/ratko-mladic-warcrimes-trial.
103 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadi, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT,
Prosecution's Marked-Up Indictment (International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber III, October 19,
6-87.
2009)
104 This oral decision is documented in Prosecutor v. Radovan
Karadfic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Prosecution Request
for Certification to Appeal Judgment of Acquittal Under Rule 98 bis
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial
Chamber III, July 13, 2012) 1.
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May 25, 2012. In early June 2012, Trial Chamber III
judges, prosecution, and defense teams took a five-day
visit to Srebrenica.105 This is interesting, as it is not
common for the Court to visit the scene of the crime.
The defense case is scheduled to commence on
October 16, 2012.106

Underneath the headlines, we see a very busy
tribunal, with 35 cases still ongoing even as it is working
to complete its mandate. For example, the trial of Goran
Had2id, former President of the Republic of Serbian
Krajina, will commence on October 16.107 The ICTY is
also working hard to solidify its legacy with a number of
outreach events-for example, releasing a documentary,
entitled "Sexual Violence and the Triumph of Justice"
about the crucial role of the ICTY in prosecuting

105 Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, "Press Release:
Karadfi6 Case: Trial Chamber Conducts Site Visit in and around
Srebrenica" (June 5, 2012), online: http://www.icty.org/sid/10980
[ICTY Srebrenica Site Visit]. A site visit to Sarajevo took place in
2011: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
"Press Release: Karadi Case: Trial Chamber Conducts Site Visit
in Sarajevo" (May 16, 2011), online: http://www.icty.org/sid/1065 1.
106 ICTY Srebrenica Site Visit, supra note 105.
107 Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, "Case Information
Sheet: Goran Hadi", 2, online: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
hadzic/cis/en/cis hadzic en.pdf.
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wartime sexual violence. 108 The documentary has been
screened in Zagreb and Belgrade. 109

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) has largely finished its trial phase and is now
focusing on appeals. The Tribunal seems to be on track
to finish all appeals by December 2014.110 In recognition
of this progress toward closure, on July 1, the Arusha
branch of the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals (MICT), a residual court, opened. This
development received some press coverage.1"1 The
MICT is to continue operations of the Court that cannot
be closed down when the Court-proper closes its doors.
For example, three indictees under ICTR jurisdiction

108 The documentary is described on the ICTY's website, Sexual
Violence and the Triumph of Justice" (2011), online:
http://www.icty.org/sid/10949.
109 Id
110 U.N.S.C., Letter Dated 22 May 2012 from the President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2012/349 (May 22,
2012), 100 [ICTR Completion Strategy Report].
Ill

U.N. Mechanism for Int'l Crim. Trib., "Press Release:
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) Begins
online:
2012),
(July
2,
Arusha"
in
Work
http://unmict.org/news/2012/120702_PRIe.html.

202 Valerie Oosterveld

remain at large: one in Kenya, one in Zimbabwe, and
one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
MICT will continue to track them. 112
This year was a significant one for the ICTR in that
the judges finally accepted requests from the Prosecutor
to transfer cases to Rwanda. 11 3 Eight cases have been
referred to Rwandan jurisdiction.11 4 In addition, beneath
the press reports, the ICTR issued several important
judgments over the past year. For example, Callixte
Nzabonimana, the Rwandan Minister of Youth and
Associative Movements in 1994, was convicted of
genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced to
life imprisonment." 5 In June 2012, Ildephonse
Nizeyimana was sentenced to life imprisonment for his
actions that led to the killing of thousands of Tutsis, as
well as the targeted killings of several high-profile Tutsis

12 ICTR Completion Strategy Report, supra note 110 at
113 Id. at

5.

4.

114 U.N.S.C., Letter Deated 14 November 2012 from the President
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/20012/836
(November 14, 2012), TT 4-5, 12-16.
115 Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana, Case No.
ICTR-98-44D-T,
Judgment and Sentence (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Trial Chamber III, May 31, 2012) Disposition at 360 and
1822.
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to advance the genocide. 1 16 The ICTR also issued
judgments in two multi-accused trials, popularly known
as "Government 1" and "Government HI." Government I

was decided in February 2012, and Government II was
decided on September 30, 2011 (with two acquittals)."17
While this does not relate to the ICTR directly, it is
relevant to note that the gacaca community courts in
Rwanda completed their work in June 2012, having
considered the cases of over two million people,
according to official government statistics.1 18

116 Prosecutor v. Ildiphonse Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-200055C-T, Judgment and Sentence (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Trial Chamber 111,June 19, 2012) IT 1581, 1599.
117 "Government I" is Prosecutor v. Edouard Karemera and
Matthieu Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T. Judgment and
Sentence (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial
Chamber III, February 2, 2012), convictions at 310. sentencing at
1762-1763; Government II is Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu,
Justin Mugenzi, Jr6me-Cl6ment Bicamumpaka and Prosper
Mugiraneza, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Judgment and Sentence
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber 11,
September 30, 2011), convictions and acquittals at 538-539,
sentencing at IT 2021-2022.
118 BBC News Africa, "Rwanda 'Gacaca' Genocide Courts Finish
Work" (June 18, 2012), online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-1 8490348.

204 Valerie Oosterveld

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC) was established in response to the
atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge regime, which
controlled Cambodia from 1975-1979. The Khmer
Rouge forced millions of Cambodians from the cities to
the countryside in an attempt to create a classless
agrarian society. It is estimated that over two million
Cambodians died as a result, from execution, starvation,
exhaustion from overwork, and disease. The ECCC was
in the news this year for a positive reason and also for
negative reasons.
The positive reason for media attention is that the
trial in Case 2 against three senior Khmer Rouge
officials commenced on November 21, 2011.119 This
trial will only deal with the forced transfer of persons out
of Phnom Penh and other urban areas and the related
crimes against humanity charges.1 20 The Court has
already heard a great deal of evidence.

119 Extraordinary Chambers in the Ct. of Cambodia, "Press Release:
Trial Chamber Announces Date for Opening of the Substantive
Hearing
in Case 002"
(October
18,
2011), online:
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/media/ECCC%2018%20
Oct%20201 1-Eng.pdf.
120 Extraordinary Chambers in the Ct of Cambodia, "Press Release:
Severance of Proceedings Ordered in Case 002" (September 22,
2011), online: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/media/
ECCC%2022%20September/o2020 11 -Eng.pdf.
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The negative reason for the ECCC making headlines
is that there appears to be political interference in
Cases 3 and 4. Cases 3 and 4 involve five lower-ranking
Khmer Rouge officials. Investigations into the crimes
began in September 2009 but were closed in April 2011
amid claims of interference by the Cambodian
government. The decision to end the investigations was
strongly criticized by Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley,
who made a formal request for the investigations to
proceed and accused the co-investigating judges of
trying to bury the cases.121 Co-Investigating Judge Blunk
eventually resigned in October 2011, amid criticism.122
Then the Reserve Judge was appointed as the new
International Co-Investigating Judge, but he was blocked
in his work and it appeared to be again by Cambodian
government interference. 123 He resigned in March 2012,
citing an inability to perform the functions of his
office.1 24 Thus, this past year at the ECCC has seen
121 Extraordinary Chambers in the Ct. of Cambodia, "Statement
from the International Co-Prosecutor regarding Case File 003"
(May 9, 2011) online: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/statementintemational-co-prosecutor-regarding-case-file-00.
122 Extraordinary Chambers in the Ct. of Cambodia, "Statement by
the International Co-Investigating Judge" (October 10, 2011),
online: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/statement-internationalco-investigating-judge; and Open Society Justice Initiative, "The
Future of Cases 003/004 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts
of
Cambodia"
(October
2012),
online:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ecccreport-cases3and4-100112 0.pdf [OSJI Report on Cases 003/004].
123 OSJI Report on Cases 003/004, supra note 123 at 9-10.
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growing tensions between the Cambodian and
international judges at the ECCC, as well as continuing
allegations of interference by the government of
Cambodia. Unfortunately, these developments cause
many to question the Court's credibility.1 25
Flying somewhat under the media radar was the
appeal in the ECCC's first case, that of Duch, former
Commander of the notorious S-21 prison. He was
originally convicted in July 2010 to 30 years'
imprisonment, which he appealed. 1 26 He argued that he
was not a senior leader or one of those most responsible
for Khmer Rouge atrocities.127 On February 3, 2012, the
Supreme Court Chamber (SCC) ruled, rejecting these
arguments. The SCC found that the concepts of "most
responsible" and "senior leaders" were non-justiciable
policy guides for the co-investigating judges and CoProsecutors when determining the scope of the ECCC's
investigations and prosecutions. 1 28 They also increased

124

Id. at 10-11.

125 See entire report at id.
126 Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eay alias Duch, Case No. 00 1/18-072007/ECCC/TC, Judgment (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of
Cambodia, Trial Chamber, July 26, 2010).
127 Prosecutor v. Kaing Guck Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-072007/ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgment (Extraordinary Chambers in the
Cts. of Cambodia, Supreme Court Chamber, February 3, 2012) 1 23.
128 Id. at

63-74.
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his sentence to life imprisonment, saying that "the high
number of deaths and the extended period of time over
which the crimes were committed place this case among
the gravest before international criminal tribunals." 1 29

Special Tribunal for Lebanon
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is not often in the
international media, though it is discussed quite a bit in
the local Lebanese media, so the Court may be unknown
to many of you. It is tasked with addressing
responsibility for the assassination of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who was killed, along with
21 others, in an attack in Beirut on February 14, 2005. It
is the first international tribunal with the mandate to
prosecute the international crime of terrorism in
peacetime. In June 2011, four individuals were indicted
by the Tribunal-all are suspected members of
Hezbollah. 130 Their arrest warrants were made public in
August 2011.131 Each has been charged with nine
129 Id. at %376, 383.
130 Prosecutor v. Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Salim Jamil
Ayyash,
Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra, Case No. STL-1 101/I/PTJ, Indictment (Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Pre-Trial
Judge, June 10, 2011) [STL Indictment].
131 Special Trib. for Lebanon, "Press Release: Indictment and its
Confirmation Made Public" (August 17, 2011), online:
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-releases/1 7-08-2011 -indictme
nt-and-its-confirmation-decision-made-public.
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criminal counts, including the premeditated intentional
homicide of Hariri and 21 others.' 32
The most significant ruling of the Special Tribunal
of the past year came on February 1, 2012, in a finding
that the proceedings against an accused could proceed in
absentia. 133 Trial in absentia is a form of trial of last
resort for the Special Tribunal, so the Trial Chamber
only permitted this form of trial after it had concluded
that the accused had in fact absconded and that the
Lebanese authorities had done all that could be expected
to apprehend the accused. 134 Since deciding that the trial
could proceed in absentia, defense counsel have been
assigned, and preparations by both the Prosecutor and
defense, including disclosure of documents, the
examination of witnesses, and collection of evidence
have begun.1 35 In May 2012, the defense filed a motion
to reconsider the decision to proceed in absentia, but this

132 STL Indictment, supra note 131 at

1.

133 Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine,
Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra, Case No. STL-l 101/I/TC, Decision to Hold Trial In Absentia (Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, Trial Chamber, February 1, 2012).
13 4

Id. at

11.

135 Special Trib. for Lebanon, "Special Tribunal for Lebanon:
Fourth Annual Report (2012-2013)" (2013), 29-31, 33, online:
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/president-s-reports-and-memo
[Report of the STL
randa/fourth-annual-report-2012-2013
President].
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was rejected by the Trial Chamber on July 11.136 The
date for the trial is tentatively set for March 25, 2013.137
Another important development-though not widely
reported-is that, on July 30, 2012, the Trial Chamber
released its decision on the legality of the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, finding that the Tribunal did in fact have
jurisdiction to try the accused. 138 The defense had earlier
brought a motion claiming that the Security Council
resolution creating the Tribunal was an abuse of Council
powers.1 39 Also not widely reported: the possibility of
more indictments or more charges in cases involving
killings similar to that of Hariri; in May 2012, 58 of 73
victim-participation applications were approved; and a

136 Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine,
Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra, Case No. STL-1 101/PT/TC, Decision on Reconsideration of Trial In Absentia
Decision (Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Trial Chamber, July 11,
2012) 14.
137 Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine,
Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra, Case No. STL-1 1Ol/PT/PTJ, Order Setting a Tentative Date for the Start of Trial
Proceedings (Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Pre-Trial Judge,
July 19, 2012) 8.
138 Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine,
Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra, Case No. STL-1 101/PT/TC, Decision on the Defence Challenges to the Jurisdiction
and Legality of the Tribunal (Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Trial
Chamber, July 27, 2012) 30.
13 9

Id. at

1.
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Legal Aid Policy for Victims' Participation was adopted
by the Tribunal. 140 In June 2012, victims' counsel were
sworn in. 14 1 Clearly, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is
more active than the press coverage would lead one to
believe.

Conclusion
International criminal justice makes headlines these
days. I have covered a number of important stories in the
media over the past year. But international criminal
justice is so much more than just the issuances of
groundbreaking trial judgments: there are the stories
behind the stories of individuals working hard to make
this world a more just place. And yet, of course, there is
still much more that can be done in the legal sector and
in other areas. This is encapsulated in a comment by
James Kpomgbo, whose arm was cut off during the
Sierra Leone civil war, after the release of the Taylor

140 Report of the STL President, supra note 135 at 27; Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, "Press Release: Victims' Participation"
(May 9, 2012), online: http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/medialpressreleases/09-05-2012-victims-participation; Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, "Legal Aid Policy for Victims' Participation" (April 4,
2012),
online:
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/victimsparticipation-documents/legal-aid-policy-for-victims-participation.
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judgment: "I will reflect on the suffering we suffered
today, but I want to forget-we have known all along
Charles Taylor is guilty. Today is just another day where
we must find food."1 4 2

142 IRIN, "Now we can move on," supra note 24.

